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ALD-158        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3723 
___________ 
 
HOWARD WALSH, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CORPORAL CHRISTOPHER POPP, DELAWARE STATE POLICE 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-17-cv-01025) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 23, 2018 
Before:  MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 7, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Howard Walsh appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Walsh is an inmate in the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center.  In his complaint, 
he alleged that, on October 6, 2014, a customer at a gun shop called the Delaware State 
Police to report suspicious activity.  The police arrived, found Walsh in the parking lot, 
and placed him in custody.  Corporal Christopher Popp, the defendant here, interrogated 
Walsh.  Eventually, Popp, through the use of threats, induced Walsh to allow him to 
search his apartment, where Popp found two firearms.  Walsh was eventually convicted 
of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited and sentenced to 33 years’ 
imprisonment.  See Walsh v. State, 143 A.3d 710 (Del. 2016) (table).   
 Walsh raised three claims against Popp under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He claimed that 
Popp had violated his privilege against self-incrimination, had performed an unlawful 
search, and had failed to produce the video footage of his interrogation.  The District 
Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), concluded that Walsh had 
filed his claims after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, and dismissed 
the complaint.  Walsh appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of 
review.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  A district court can 
dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted”; a complaint fails to state a claim if the allegations do not “plausibly give rise to 
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an entitlement to relief.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).  We may affirm on 
any ground apparent on the record.  See Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 
469 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 We agree with the District Court that Walsh’s claim that Popp performed an 
illegal search is time-barred.1  In Delaware, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is 
two years, see McDowell v. Del. State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 1996), and 
Walsh’s claim accrued when the search occurred, see Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cty. 
Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 861 (3d Cir. 2014), on October 6, 2014.  Walsh did 
not file his complaint until July 24, 2017, after the limitations period expired.  Walsh 
argues on appeal that he was delayed in filing because there was a prison riot in February 
2017, but that occurred after the statute of limitations had expired.  Further, while Walsh 
alleges that Popp hindered his presentation of this claim by failing to disclose the video 
of the interrogation, Walsh did not need the video to know about the existence of his 
alleged injury.  See generally New Castle Cty. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 
1125 (3d Cir.1997) (“a claim accrues upon awareness of actual injury”); see also Paige v. 
Police Dep’t of Schenectady, 264 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (rejecting 
similar argument). 
                                              
1 Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may sua 
sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e), where, as here, the defense is obvious from 
the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.  See Fogle v. Pierson, 
435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); cf. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
4 
 
 Meanwhile, Walsh’s self-incrimination claim did not accrue until his statement 
was used against him at trial.  See Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 558–59 (3d Cir. 2003); 
see generally Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).  It appears that even this 
occurred more than two years before Walsh filed his complaint, but the record is not 
entirely clear.  However, even if the claim is not time-barred, Walsh’s allegations are 
entirely undeveloped and conclusory, and he has therefore failed “to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  
Therefore, the District Court did not err in dismissing this claim.2 
 Finally, Walsh appears to raise a Brady claim concerning the state’s failure to 
produce the video footage of his interrogation.  This claim is barred by the rule of Heck 
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “a prisoner 
cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the 
unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.”  Wilkinson v. 
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).  Walsh’s Brady claim implies the invalidity of his 
conviction, see, e.g., Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1999), and, indeed, he 
argues that the suppression of the video prevented him from raising a successful defense 
in his criminal proceedings.  Because Walsh has not shown that his conviction has been 
set aside, he cannot bring the claim at this time.  See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
                                              
2 We are satisfied, especially in light of Walsh’s failure to provide more detail before this 
Court, that the District Court did not err when it did not give Walsh leave to amend.  See 
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 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
                                                                                                                                                 
generally Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).  
